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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion on adherence to social norms. It 
considers insights from multiple research traditions in an effort to explain how individual 
learning and action are connected to social norms. One strand of philosophical tradition 
holds that non-representational learning and skillful coping carried out unconsciously are 
underestimated by both scientific and philosophical traditions. The present research com-
bines this tradition with the literature on the evolution of social norms and suggests that ex-
perienced individuals in a society adhere to social norms better than novice agents do. We 
explain this phenomenon by unconscious and non-representational cognitive processes. 
This framework is then used to investigate population-level outcomes of individual learning. 
Keywords: adherence to norms, expertise, skillful coping.
RESUMO
Este artigo tem como objetivo contribuir para a discussão em curso sobre a adesão às nor-
mas sociais. Ele cosnidera insights de múltiplas tradições de pesquisa em um esforço para 
explicar como a aprendizagem e a ação individuais estão conectadas às normas sociais. 
Uma vertente da tradição filosófica sustenta que a aprendizagem não representacional e o 
enfrentamento hábil inconscientemente são subestimados pelas tradições científicas e filo-
sóficas. A presente pesquisa combina esta tradição com a literatura sobre a evolução das 
normas sociais e sugere que os indivíduos experientes em uma sociedade adiram às normas 
sociais melhor do que os agentes novatos. Explicamos este fenômeno por processos cog-
nitivos inconscientes e não representativos. Este quadro é então utilizado para investigar 
resultados de nível individual da aprendizagem individual.
Palavras-chave: aderência às normas, perícia, habilidades de enfrentamento.
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Introduction 
The paper investigates how implicit learning affects the formation of social norms and 
rule following in societies. The role of learning and tacit knowledge has been a consideration 
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in economics since the studies by Hayek (1937, 1945) and 
Nelson and Winter (1982). Herein, the paper posits that 
their research on price formation in markets and produc-
tion organization in firms could be extended to adherence 
to norms and rule-following behavior in societies. In essence, 
tacit knowledge and unconscious coping abilities—the hall-
marks of expertise—have significant effects on rule-follow-
ing behavior. Moreover, the rational actor model cannot 
adequately capture these effects when population-level out-
comes are considered.
The classical constitutional conundrum, according to 
Samuel Bowles (2006), is the fundamental problem of all so-
cieties. It is about how to harmonize individual preferences 
and social outcomes. In other words, how can we direct, if 
indeed necessary, self-intere ed individuals toward a ions 
for the benefit of society? In answering this question and con-
sidering its variations the literature is inconsistent, as a result 
of differences in assumptions, presumptions, and methods. 
On the one hand, mechanical and rational answers dominate 
the agenda, as behavior is reduced to the calculation of costs 
and benefits, on the other hand, intuition, disposition, and 
arational patterns are used to explain the formation and evo-
lution of behavior.
On the other hand, disciplines including philosophy, 
economics, and biology deal with the issue. Philosophy 
employs the analytical tradition and phenomenology, eco-
nomics uses neoclassical theory and new institutional the-
ory, and cognitive science uses symbolism and connection-
ism. All of these research disciplines maintain the division 
mentioned above and provide conflicting explanations for 
the causes and implications of the classical constitutional 
conundrum.
In the paper, it is attempted to bring together the ap-
proaches of these two traditions to explain adherence to 
norms in societies. The rational actor model and ‘pure logic 
of choice’ are not adequate for gaining an understanding of 
norm adherence; however, criticism alone is not sufficient. 
Our aim is to use the findings of conflicting approaches in 
a complementary manner to synthesize an explanation for 
rule-following behavior. The theoretical and empirical liter-
ature on both sides is extensive, but to the best of our knowl-
edge few researchers have brought them together, notably 
Lane et al. (1996), Langlois (1998), Negru (2013); see also 
Opp (2013) and Aydogmus et al. (2015). It is our aim to high-
light the possibility of bridging these divergent paths. In this 
regard, this paper further develops the arguments in Aydog-
mus et al. (2015).
The paper begins with a review of the literature on 
unconscious cognitive processes and its philosophical basis. 
Next, evolutionary literature on the formation and evolution 
of social norms is reviewed. Then, a simple game theoretic ex-
ample is provided on how studies on rule-following behavior 
could be improved by taking into account unconscious cogni-
tive processes. Lastly, the implications of our framework and 
further research needs are discussed.
Unconscious cognitive 
processes in decision-making: 
non-representational abilities
When it comes to norm formation at the societal lev-
el, individuals’ decisions and the evolution of their behavior 
are important microdeterminants. That is why the way in-
dividuals learn and the way their decisions evolve are also 
important. How does an individual choose to act according 
to a norm? The dilemma to consider is whether individuals 
act rationally in a complex environment, as Herbert Simon 
(1996) suggests, or do they use skills beyond their conceptu-
al framework, without (consciously) thinking about them, as 
Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus (1980, 1988) insist. The 
answers to these questions have implications for the forma-
tion and persistence of norms.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (1996) embodied knowledge, 
Michael Polanyi’s (2012) skills, and Dreyfus’s (1993) work re-
lating both concepts to modern cognitive science constitute 
the epistemological background of the present work. They 
highlight the importance of unconscious cognitive capaci-
ty and contend that unconsciously formed skills and tacit 
knowledge play a primary role in how individuals understand 
and cope with reality.
Learning and a ion cannot be explained by referring 
only to intentional and representational content. For exam-
ple, an individual does not consciously make complex physi-
cal calculations when bicycling, even though it appears to be 
necessary for balancing a bicycle. To safely stop a moving car 
an individual does not need to calculate the stopping distance, 
according to such variables as the current  eed, state of the 
brake pads, friction between the road and tires, and air resis-
tance. Individuals cope with life with the help of multiple ca-
pacities, some of which are not consciously controlled. These 
capacities seem to lack conscious representational content.
By introducing the concept of “tacit knowledge” Polanyi 
(2012 [1958]) makes a significant contribution to the phi-
losophy of mind and a ion. Tacit knowledge, unlike explicit 
or codified knowledge, is extremely difficult or impossible to 
codify (express with language) and transfer to others. Knowl-
edge of riding a bicycle, playing tennis, or driving a car are 
examples of knowledge with tacit content. In the remainder 
of this paper these adaptive behaviors based on unconscious 
skills and/or tacit knowledge will be referred to as skillful cop-
ing, according to Dreyfus (1993). To acquire such knowledge 
or skills an individual needs to go through an appropriate 
sequence of experiences relevant to the skill being acquired. 
According to Polanyi (2012 [1958]), skills are performed and 
assessed via subsidiary awareness. Such knowledge, skills and 
tools associated with them become internalized via experi-
ence. Polanyi suggests that they become integral to us in the 
same sense that our limbs are part of us. As such, a racket 
becomes an integral part of a professional tennis player and 
a walking stick becomes an integral part of a blind man. 
Ozgur Aydogmus • Hasan Cagatay • Erkan Gürpinar • Fuat Oguz
Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 18(3): 140-145, sep/dec 2017 142
In both cases, unlike a novice, an expert does not need to pay 
attention to the use of his/her tool; it is as if they are using 
their own limbs.
According to Dreyfus’s theory, which is based on Mer-
leau-Ponty’s (1996) Phenomenology of Perception, learning is 
not independent of the body. At least some knowledge be-
comes part of one’s unconscious decision-making pattern and 
becomes a skill. Tacit knowing and skills of this type become 
endogenous to the decision-making process, without repre-
sentational content in the mind of the individual (Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus, 2004; Dreyfus, 1993, p. 24). In essence, skill 
acquisition reduces the costly burden of rational calculation 
without compromising the outcome.
Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus (1988) describe five 
discrete stages of learning, from novice to expert: Novice; ad-
vanced beginner; competence; proficiency; expert. Through-
out the process of advancing from novice to expert, individ-
uals acquire new knowledge and behavioral patterns. While 
in the first few stages a learner acts in a rule-driven manner, 
in the later stages experience is assimilated in such a way that 
intuitive rea ions replace reasoned responses. On the road to 
expertise an individual recognizes increasingly more patterns 
and behaves according to newly acquired skills. While mov-
ing through these five stages an individual becomes less proce-
dure-driven, less analytical, and more intuitive (Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus, 2004, 1988, 1980).
Merleau-Ponty, Polanyi, and Dreyfus agree that uncon-
scious processes play a pivotal role in our behaviors and dis-
credit all attempts to analyze cognition without considering 
these processes. They also support the notion of a holistic ap-
proach to learning and the importance of human intera ion 
with the environment. It is our conclusion that unconscious 
cognitive processes could be classified as follows: (a) Non-rep-
resentationality: Skillful coping is not accompanied by repre-
sentational ideas and analytical processes. Instead, it is integral 
to the body. (b) Holistic nature: Skillful coping is holistic. (c) 
Experience dependence: Skillful coping improves with experi-
ence. (d) Stability: They are less sensitive to conscious cogni-
tive changes and this makes them more stable. That is to say, 
they do not change all of a sudden. Instead, they change grad-
ually. To illustrate, both learning and unlearning bicycling hap-
pen gradually and continuously in contrast to learning how to 
multiply two integers or learning the capital city of Austria. 
According to Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus (1988), 
modern philosophy of mind and artificial intelligence research 
underestimate the importance of non-representational learn-
ing, namely, learning that is not mediated by consciously acces-
sible representations. Similarly, in economics it is also highlight-
ed that the a ions of individuals are only partially explainable 
by conscious processes. In these approaches, which are critical 
to the mainstream idea that representational skills and knowl-
edge are the only determinants of decision making, it is argued 
that unconscious cognitive processes are the hallmark of exper-
tise (Lane et al., 1996, p. 52). As more feedback accumulates, in-
dividuals progress from novice to expert. In complex environ-
ments a novice simply relies on analytical computations and 
rationality, with limited cognitive resources, whereas experts 
employ a holistic, non-representational approach. Expert indi-
viduals “experience and understand their worlds only through 
their intera ions with other agents” (Lane et al., 1996, p. 75). 
The rational actor model in economics cannot adequately ex-
plain expertise of this sort (Lane et al., 1996).
In general, unconscious cognitive abilities are associated 
with expertise in a task, e.g. hitting a tennis ball with top spin. 
However, these abilities and tendencies are not only confined 
to these kinds of tasks but also are related to norm-follow-
ing behavior in societies. Just like in the case of expert and 
novice tennis players in which the former unconsciously does 
more tasks compared to the latter, in norm-related contexts 
experts unconsciously perform more norm-related tasks than 
novice individuals. In other words, we enlarge the extent of 
“expertise” to include norm-related decisions and skills such 
that individuals who have been members of their re ective 
societies for longer periods of time, accumulate and internal-
ize experience and use them unconsciously are qualified as 
experts. Moreover, the chara eristics of task-related uncon-
scious cognitive processes, i.e. non-representationality, holis-
tic nature, experience dependence and stability are shared by 
norm-related unconscious cognitive processes which are the 
hallmarks of expertise in social contexts.
Evolution of and adherence to 
norms in societies  
Is expertise that results from social intera ions a factor 
associated with adherence to social norms? Put in another 
way, how does learning or expertise affect adherence to social 
norms? When individuals make decisions, they usually do not 
consider the effects their decisions have on society (Hardin, 
1968); however, such consideration is of utmost importance 
to evolutionary social theory. As Gintis (2007) points out, the 
beliefs, constraints, and preferences of individuals in the social 
sphere matter. As such, individual learning makes sense in a 
framework in which reconciliation of individual and social 
outcomes is properly addressed (Bowles, 2006). Therefore, the 
evolutionary approach emphasizes that individual learning oc-
curs in an environment chara erized by strategic intera ions.
As discussed in the previous section, there is a vast liter-
ature on the complexity of decision making and coping with 
it. Bounded rationality, according to Simon (1996), highlights 
our limited capacity to engage in complex issues. We econo-
mize the use of our limited cognitive capacities by adhering to 
evolved rules of thumb. Other mechanisms that enable indi-
viduals and society to cope with complexity include uncon-
scious cognitive processes and evolved social norms. These 
mechanisms are foundational to how we think and behave 
(Young, 2015). In other words, unconscious cognitive pro-
cesses and adherence to social norms reduce the cognitive 
cost of acquiring skills (Boyd and Richerson, 1985). 
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Rather than deciding which social norms to follow 
and which not to, individuals simply inherit surviving social 
norms and learn through intera ion with others. In this re-
gard, expert agents have the ability to adhere to social norms 
and exhibit appropriate behavior in novel situations. It is sug-
ge ed that expertise is related to the agent’s level of under-
standing of the social context in which he/she is intera ing, 
which is acquired via multiple intera ions over time (Lane 
et al., 1996). Thus, according to evolutionary game theory 
it is reasonable to assume that the behavior of expert agents 
may “lead to novel situations that the participants construct 
together in anticipation of mutual benefits that they cannot 
clearly foresee […]” (Lane et al., 1996, p. 61).
In this framework social norms evolve through dynamic 
learning and these norms form the basis of social and eco-
nomic order (Young, 2015). In other words, adherence to so-
cial norms provides the basis of social order. Here we add to 
this framework the notion that expert agents adhere to social 
norms in greater number than novice agents, resulting in so-
cial order. The inclusion of expert agents in a game-theoret-
ical framework can significantly improve our understanding 
of adherence to social norms.
Evolutionary game theory usually treats the evolution 
of social norms as a non-cooperative common interest game 
(Bowles, 2006). Common interest is crucial to the formation 
of social norms, as the percentage of a population that wants a 
particular social outcome must reach a threshold level for the 
behavior associated with the desired outcome to be accepted 
as a social norm. In this case, adherence to the social norm 
provides great benefit to both individuals and society. In con-
trast, social norm violation is beneficial to free riders, as norm 
enforcement is endogenous, i.e. it is individual social agents 
that decide for themselves whether or not to adhere to norms. 
The development and evolution of social norms has been a 
focal point of researchers (Hamilton, 1964; Trivers, 1971). 
Expert agents generally adhere to social norms, which is ben-
eficial to society. The following section provides an example 
that illustrates how novice and expert social agents adhere to 
traffic rules, i.e. a social norm.
Formation of traffic rules
Consider cooperation in traffic as discussed in Aydog-
mus et al. (2015). The evolution of cooperation in traffic can 
simply be represented as a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game, as 
follows. For the sake of simplicity, consider two drivers trying 
to reach their destinations. If there is no traffic both drivers 
reach their destination in 10 minutes and if there is traffic it 
takes 20 minutes, provided each driver in the traffic drives 
nicely; however, if one of the drivers (D1) does not allow the 
other driver (D2) to merge into traffic safely, i.e. D1 does not 
drive nicely, D2 may be forced onto another street. Conse-
quently, reaching the destination for D2 takes 30 minutes, 
whereas for D1 it takes 15 minutes due to his aggressive driv-
ing behavior. If D1 and D2 drive aggressively, there is bound to 
be a collision elsewhere and then traffic will eventually cause 
the average commute to be 25 minutes. These four scenarios 
can be summarized as follows:
  D1 drives nicely (20 minutes to commute); D2 drives 
nicely (20 minutes to commute).
  D1 drives aggressively (15 minutes to commute); D2 
drives nicely (30 minutes to commute).
  D1 drives nicely (30 minutes to commute); D2 drives 
aggressively (15 minutes to commute).
  D1 drives aggressively (25 minutes to commute); D2 
drives aggressively (25 minutes to commute).
As is well known, the Nash equilibrium for this game 
is that D1 and D2 drive aggressively, whereas in reality some 
drivers are aggressive and some are not. As mentioned earlier, 
expert agents tend to adhere to a social norm (e.g. driving nice-
ly) unconsciously, whereas novice agents tend to make a more 
conscious effort in an attempt to gain as much an advantage 
as possible. To put it differently, a population of novice agents 
that are worse at adhering to social norms may exist in a state 
of defection more easily, i.e. everybody drives aggressively. Be 
aware that the opposite scenario, in which driving aggressively 
is the social norm, is as plausible as the above given scenario.
We have said that the hallmark of expert agents is ad-
herence to social norms. Adherence to social norms by expert 
agents leads to stabilized outcomes. In other words, expert 
agents facilitate maintenance of incumbent social norms. 
Hence, once a norm is formed, the population adheres to 
it if there is a sufficient number of expert agents. This is to 
say that for some societies driving nicely becomes the norm, 
whereas in others defection, i.e. driving aggressively, becomes 
the norm. There are other examples that model intera ion in 
traffic by using a PD game (see Levine, 2012, p. 25).
Experts follow the majority under certain conditions in 
line with Boyd and Richerson (1985) and Henrich and Boyd 
(2001). This type of behavior is a shortcut to acquiring sever-
al adaptive rules of behavior (Henrich and Boyd, 2001, p. 81). 
For example, following the majority may lead to cooperation 
under certain conditions (Henrich and Boyd, 1998, 2001; 
Mengel, 2009; Smith and Bell, 1994). Evolutionary game the-
ory, as used by Maynard Smith (1982) in biology and Rob-
ert Sugden (1989) in economics, tends to overlook the fact 
that learning social agents cope skillfully. The formation and 
evolution of social norms is not only affected by rational pro-
cesses, but also by unconscious processes. In this regard, the 
paper contributes to the literature by pointing out that the 
intera ion of novice and expert agents can improve our un-
derstanding of the process of norm adherence.
 
Discussion: tacit knowing, 
expertise and social norms
In order to fully understand the formation of and ad-
herence to social norms, it is necessary to move beyond the 
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boundaries of the rational actor model. There are several 
ways to learn and transmit social norms. According to Bowles 
(2006) and Young (2015), factors such as expected future 
gains, fear of punishment, and following the tendency of soci-
ety may explain why individuals adhere to social norms. For 
example, how punishment affects norm formation is studied 
by Yu et al. (2015). Here we focused on two additional factors 
that explain adherence to social norms. First, implicit learn-
ing that results from persistent intera ions with other agents 
causes novice agents to gradually develop non-representa-
tional skills and tacit knowledge over time and to eventually 
become expert agents. Second, adherence to social norms, 
which is made possible by unconscious skills and non-repre-
sentational cognitive processes, helps to sustain incumbent 
norms in a society. 
The existence of differences in behavior between expert 
and novice agents could be confirmed using evolutionary 
game theory and a heterogeneous group of intera ing social 
agents. By incorporating the role of expert agents into the 
evolutionary game theory framework, the discussion of how 
implicit learning is related to adaptation in social environ-
ments can be improved. For such an attempt, see Aydogmus 
et al. (2015). They argue that relating the behavior of expert 
agents to the internalization of social norms and behaving 
accordingly without consciously represented rules in the 
mind show that the percentage of expert agents in any so-
ciety is important for the maintenance of incumbent norms. 
Accordingly, once a social norm is formed a society adheres 
to it if the number of expert agents in that society reaches the 
necessary threshold.
According to the literature, the formation of social norms 
is considered a non-cooperative common interest game. The 
relevant theoretical game models rely on the assumption that 
there are no exogenous rules regarding the acceptance of so-
cial norms (Bowles, 2006). Moreover, the evolution of social 
norms is a common interest game, as a threshold number of 
norm-following agents is necessary for a norm to be accepted, 
and if the threshold is reached, a high-level of expected bene-
fit is provided to society (Bowles, 2006). Nonetheless, as social 
norms are self-reinforcing, social agents want to follow them 
when they think others are doing the same (Young, 2015). 
In other words, although a social norm may provide a basis for 
beneficial social intera ions, opportunistic social agents may 
benefit by violating it, i.e. the well-known free rider problem. 
The spread of norms that are socially beneficial, e.g. coopera-
tion, is explained by group selection theory, which posits that 
adherence to certain social norms is beneficial to those groups 
that adhere to them (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sfor-
za and Feldman, 1981).
A further research need is to determine whether an 
e ablished social norm is resistant to threats by non-rule 
followers, which is most likely associated with the number 
of novice and expert agents that threaten the existing social 
norm. Hence, research should be conducted to determine the 
percentage of novice and/or expert social agents in a given 
society that is required to displace an incumbent social norm 
(for example, see Lozano et al., 2008, for a stochastic model 
placed upon a network structure). For reference purposes, 
there is an extensive literature on the enforcement of cooper-
ative norms (Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Fehr et al., 2002). The 
present paper contributes to the literature as it is the first one 
to put together such disparate avenues of research on social 
norms and learning (novice and expert social agents) in order 
to examine the role of tacit knowing in adherence to social 
norms. The framework presented here could be generalized 
to the study of how several social norms emerge in the pres-
ence of heterogeneous agents.
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